










































Digital economy and structural change
• Telecommunication provides the basis for a strong division of labour in a
globally networked economy. A telecoms sector which allows more competition
and makes technological and economic progress is a major asset in the
international competition to attract business and investment.
• It is disquieting that even today there is still not real competition among
entirely equal players. The former monopolist continues to dominate the market
so strongly that critics speak of mere “pretend“ competition. In the medium
term, though, alternative technologies will further advance competition in
communication. Today, mobile telephony is a segment whose dynamic is helping
to break through the crusted structures in the overall industry.
• Given the shape of the market in Germany, the liberalisation of the local
loop will progress much more sluggishly even after the introduction of free
choice of operator than applied with long-distance service. At the local-network
level, prices and the leader’s market share will probably decline only slightly.
• The ex ante regulation enabling the RegTP in Germany to supervise charges is
an important instrument, but additional ones will undoubtedly be needed in
view of the complex market structure. Current developments in the
telecommunications sector demonstrate the necessity of having efficient
sanction mechanisms that are a sufficient deterrent to stop competition being
cramped. It is still too early to attempt the desired transition from sector-
specific ex ante regulation to general, technology-neutral supervision.
• Up to now, liberalisation in Germany has concentrated more on services than
on infrastructure. A re-orientation is under intense discussion, not least because
self-sustaining competition is barely conceivable without real alternatives
for network access.
• The related EU directives are not being implemented fast enough. While the
liberalisation of telecommunications in Germany is making progress, there are
still major challenges ahead particularly below the long-distance level.
• After the European Commission is granted a right of veto the ongoing
development of the market must by no means falter because of an unclear
allocation of competences between national and supranational authorities.
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For a long time, the view that the telecommunications market is a
natural monopoly was considered sacrosanct. The market was therefore
slow to change in many countries. The structure of this segment, which
is key to the growth potential of an economy1, has always been highly
complex. Conflicts over technological, legal and economic aspects look
very different, and in some cases totally irreconcilable, from the
standpoint of network operators, service providers or national and
supranational regulatory authorities. On top of that, the differences are
amplified by the ever faster changes in the communications landscape
as mobile telephony and the internet advance by leaps and bounds,
and new substitution relationships emerge between previously discrete
services in different segments.
In the years ahead, the further opening of the telecommunications
market will remain a huge political and economic challenge. For a
thorough assessment of the liberalisation efforts being made in different
countries it is necessary to distinguish clearly between mobile telephony
and fixed-line networks, between voice and data telephony, between
subscriber connection, local network and supraregional network, and
between intermediate and end products. We also examine how much
truth there is in the comment of Hans-Jürgen Michalski from the Institut
für internationale Telekommunikationsforschung (institute for
international telecommunications research) who, in view of the still
pronounced dominance of Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG), described
the German situation as “pretend competition“2.
Rigid structures – heavy legacy
In most countries the entire telecommunications sector remained in
the hands of a single state-run company for many years; in Germany
this was Deutsche Bundespost, later DTAG. The rigid structures in the
German industry stem from Articles 87 and 143b of the country’s Basic
Law, but their roots extend back to the Imperial Constitution of 1871,
which regulated the complex and intertwining powers of the federal
and state governments. The 1928 law on telephony established the
monopoly of the posts and telegraph administration that had been
defined in the constitution of 1871.
Up until the 1990s, demands that the telecommunications market be
opened were virtually blocked by this framework. There was little room
for competition to develop, either in telecommunications services, or
between the phone network of DTAG and potential alternatives, such
as broadband TV cable3, the powerline network or the cellular network.
1 For further information on the importance of the telecommunications sector for
economic growth see Auer, Josef, et al (2003): Traditional monopolies: growth
through stronger competition, in Deutsche Bank Research, Frankfurt Voice – More
growth for Germany, Frankfurt a. M.
2 Michalski, Hans-Jürgen (1999): Die Inszenierung von Wettbewerb – Die Liberalis-
ierung des deutschen Telekommunikationsmarktes: Probleme, Auswirkungen, Per-
spektiven und Kritik der Regulierung, in: WSI Mitteilungen 5/1999, Frankfurt a. M.
3 Broadband refers to technologies that operate at a transmission speed of more
than 64 kbit/s; this means they are more powerful than the ISDN service in the
fixed-line network.4 Economics
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In 1984 the USA had broken up the monopolist AT&T to form one
national company and seven independent regional companies – with
the intention of triggering “competition as discovery procedure“4 and
pushing the development of the telecommunications sector, which
was seen as essential to a globally networked economy. In the same
year the telephone monopoly in the United Kingdom was abolished
and British Telecom converted into a listed company; Japan also
liberalised its telecommunications industry back in 1985. Continental
Europe has limped along behind. It was 1998 before Germany’s postal
reform, based on legislation in 1989, 1994 and 1996, led to the demise
of the constitutionally guaranteed monopoly for the fixed-line network.
Liberalisation in Germany has concentrated primarily on competition
among service providers; it has yet to focus on competition among
network operators. This approach relies on service providers being able
to use the existing telecommunications infrastructure on a sound
business basis, which means primarily at an appropriate, non-
discriminatory price. To ensure that charges – as the basis for the desired
competition among services – are supervised effectively they are
subject to prior approval (ex ante regulation).
Since the market was opened in 1998, phone users have been able to
choose freely among providers for their long-distance and foreign calls.
The experience with liberalisation in this segment is illustrated by the
use being made of dial-around (call-by-call use of different providers),
which has done even more to open the market than pre-selection (a
contract with a single provider of choice). This empirical evidence should
guide decisions on the direction of competition policy.
Still no sign of real competition
The sector-specific regulation of the German telecommunications
market is the responsibility of the regulatory authority for
telecommunications and posts (RegTP). This was set up in January
1998 in the context of the postal reform. RegTP is supposed to push
4 Hayek, Friedrich August von (July 5, 1968): Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren
(competition as discovery procedure), address at the Kiel Institute for World Eco-
nomics.
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liberalisation and watch over the sector as it moves from a monopoly
to real competition. It supervises, in particular, the interconnection of
different telecommunications networks, shared use of technology
locations (collocation), unbundling of subscriber lines (“last mile“), and
number portability (the ability of users to retain their existing numbers
when switching to another provider). The ex ante regulation enabling
the RegTP to supervise charges5 is not always enough on its own. In
view of the complex market structure, additional instruments would
undoubtedly make the supervisory authority much more effective.
Moreover, the sanctions imposed so far have been pretty mild in relation
to the advantages that may be gained through a breach of competition.
At present they are not a sufficient deterrent to stop competition being
cramped.
The RegTP faces the difficult task of finding a sustainable compromise
between the demands of the different market participants and at the
same time creating incentives to ensure that the infrastructure is
upgraded and the whole sector makes technological and economic
progress. At present the conflict of interests centres on third-party
billing, a service that DTAG has so far provided for its rivals but which it
wants to discontinue. An investigation is under way of the current
practice, in use since 2001, whereby DTAG bills customers on its rivals’
behalf but is not responsible for issuing reminders. DTAG’s competitors
argue that without third-party billing their costs would soar. The
Association of Telecommunications and Value-Added Service Providers
(VATM) calculates that dial-around calls already cost alternative providers
interconnection fees of EUR 4 per user and month. If DTAG were
completely absolved of the obligation to provide third-party billing, there
would be additional costs of EUR 2. With revenues averaging EUR 6
per month, the average margin would thus move towards zero; some
providers, especially small ones, would almost inevitably be forced out
of the market. But, not only is there the cost argument: third-party
billing seems to affect competition by directly influencing customer
loyalty. The willingness of a user to dial around will probably dwindle if
he receives a separate bill from each individual provider. There is reason
to fear that if third-party billing is not retained intact, the market position
of DTAG will be strengthened and the opening of the market will be
held up.
As indicated in the criticism of the “pretend competition“ , DTAG has
continued to dominate the telecommunications segment in Germany
even after the market was liberalised. A string of market data reflects
the overbearing weight of the former monopolist.
Deutsche Telekom rules the roost
As use of the internet and mobile phones has increased, so too has
the number of phone minutes in the fixed-line network: by 80% since
1997 (see chart, p.  4).6 The market indicators suggest that
telecommunication is an “experience good”7 with strong customer
5 See Monopolkommission (2003): Hauptgutachten 2000/2001 - Netzwettbewerb
durch Regulierung, Baden-Baden, p. 369ff.
6 The true number of phone minutes is roughly one-third higher than the figure meas-
ured and reported in the statistics. This is partly due to the growing importance of
flat rates (permanently online), as the statistics on these do not show the actual
number of minutes.
7 See Büllingen, Franz and Peter Stamm (2003): Sektorreport Telekommunikation, in:
WIK-Consult Bericht, Bad Honnef, p. 37 .
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loyalty. The incumbent market leader enjoys a confidence bonus,
whereas newcomers have to build confidence from square one over a
period of time. DTAG’s share of phone minutes comes to over 75% in
total; in long-distance and foreign calls it is around 60%, and in local
calls a staggering 96% (see charts, p. 5).8 Like the number of phone
minutes, revenues are a good indicator of the degree of market
dominance. Even though some 250 companies now offer voice services
in Germany’s fixed-line network, the market leader captures more than
two-thirds of total fixed-line revenues (see chart p. 5). The picture as
regards the infrastructure is very similar. At the end of 2002 DTAG
leased around 950,000 subscriber lines9 to its competitors, which
means it still provides nearly 96% of all fixed-line connections (see
chart). In view of this glaring imbalance in infrastructure, it is obvious
that the legal framework governing network access for competing
companies will directly determine the development of the market. A
comparison of the price that DTAG charges to end-customers with
the intermediate prices DTAG’s rivals have to pay for the termination,
switching and assumption of a private subscriber connection gives
food for thought: alternative providers pay EUR 12.48 per month merely
to lease a standard subscriber line from DTAG, whereas a DTAG
analogue connection costs the subscriber only EUR 11.83. Such charges
make it difficult for newcomers to undercut the incumbent’s prices to
subscribers; real competition has no chance. But a turnaround here
seems highly unlikely in the near future. While the other regional
network operators are demanding that the monthly fee for a subscriber
line be reduced to less than EUR 7 , DTAG wants it raised to EUR 17 .40.
RegTP is to settle this issue by May.
Despite the conditions described above, the picture of a market totally
dominated by DTAG is not entirely accurate. Contrary to the impression
given by the nationwide statistics, the presence of DTAG varies greatly
from region to region. In more than half of Germany’s larger towns
(over 50,000 inhabitants) telephone customers have been able to
choose among several companies for their subscriber connection. In
Hamburg 12% of all local telephone channels are provided by rivals of
DTAG, in Cologne 21% and in Oldenburg an even higher 23%. Most of
these competitors are municipal transport companies or utilities.
Prominent examples of such carriers with a strong regional background
are HanseNet, ISIS Multimedia Net and NetCologne.
Prices reflect success with market opening
The degree of competition in a market cannot be measured by the
number of telecommunications companies alone. A thorough analysis
must also look at other indicators – especially prices, which vary from
segment to segment – and identify the differences.
Since the German market was opened in 1998, telecommunications
prices have dropped by 23% overall, and by over 14% in the fixed-line
network (where foreign calls have become almost 50% cheaper,
domestic long-distance calls 47%). The cost of mobile calls within
Germany has fallen nearly 39%. In the same period the price of local
calls rose by around 5% and subscriber line charges by 3%. Over the
8 If the length of the calls made under flat rates could also be recorded accurately, the
dominance of Deutsche Telekom – which provides the lion’s share of flat-rate ar-
rangements – would be even more obvious.
9 See Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (2003): Jahresbericht 2002,
Bonn, p. 20.7 Economics




































DK GB DE SE FR AT IT CH HU
Degree of liberalisation
in fixed-line network*)
*) 1: fully liberalised; 0: not liberalised
Source: WIK, 2001, as of Q1 2001
Index
longer period from 1995 to 2002 – which captures strategic changes
made by the monopolist with an eye to the impending market opening
– the difference between the various competitive segments is even
more pronounced. From 1995 to 2002 the price for national mobile
phone services plunged 63%, while subscriber line charges climbed
14% and local calls became 22% dearer.
The development of prices in the telecommunications sector shows
up the areas in which liberalisation has not gone far enough. A
comparison of the different segments highlights the need for action,
especially in the local network and with regard to subscriber
connections.
Germany praised and criticised
In the dispute over the next steps needed in liberalisation, it is not
enough to compare the prices in different segments in Germany; a
comparison with international telecommunications markets should also
provide valuable arguments. The Scientific Institute for Communication
Services (WIK), which has close links with RegTP , constructed an index
that evaluates the progress made with liberalisation in different
countries. The index includes the award of licences – an issue raised in
EU directives – as well as prices for interconnection and line leasing,
and prices charged to subscribers. In WIK’s ranking of the liberalised
markets in Europe, Germany takes third place – behind Denmark and
the United Kingdom. Like the European Commission, WIK criticises
the late start and repeated postponement of the opening of Germany’s
local networks due to technical problems. Initially planned for
December 1, 2002, and then March 1, 2003, dial-around is now to
become possible for local calls from April 25 and pre-selection from
July 9.
On the whole, the legislation in Germany sets the framework for voice
telephony but makes no provision for many specific aspects of data
telephony. With the use of data telephony growing and the importance
of voice telephony declining accordingly, the focus needs to be shifted
as soon as possible towards the new application areas.
EU directive increases dynamic
The EU would like to push ahead with the liberalisation of the market
by means of a package of directives “on competition in the markets for
electronic communications networks and services“ , which was adopted
at the beginning of 2002 on the basis of a European Commission
proposal. The overall package covers six areas and breaks down into
the framework, authorisation, access, universal service, data protection
and radio spectrum directives. It is to be transposed into the national
law of the individual member states by the end of July 2003.
Generally, the directives aim to intensify the harmonisation of the
telecommunications laws in the single market and widen the scope of
competition to include the infrastructure. To this end, the EU states
four key demands that can help achieve a shift away from sector-specific
regulation towards the general, technology-neutral supervision of
competition. First, the European Commission will have a right of veto
over the national regulators in future. In cases where the internal market
is affected directly, national solo ventures are to be nipped in the bud.
Second, all telecommunications companies will have to commit to
submit detailed reports to the national regulator about their own
business situation. Thanks to this extended information basis the unfair
use of market clout will probably be easier to recognise and the resultant
Right of veto over national regulator
in future8 Economics
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advantages enjoyed by the individual company will become easier to
quantify from the viewpoint of the regulator. Third, the national
authorities will regularly examine the necessity of continuing ex ante
regulation in each of the telecommunications sub-markets, which still
have to be defined in detail. Fourth, the punishment for abusing market
power is to be increased significantly. Plans are afoot to orient the fine
to the size of the illegally generated earnings, which the regulatory
authorities will be better able to gauge thanks to the widened scope of
company disclosure requirements.
Commission not always consistent
The set of EU directives will generally allow much more extensive and
detailed intervention in market activities of individual companies than
before. However, it is debatable whether the division of competences
is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, which is held high by
the Union. There is a risk that the foreseen allocation of competences
between the national and supranational regulatory authorities will
prolong the decision-making process and reduce planning certainty
for companies.
All in all, the signals on further liberalisation in the sector are not
thoroughly consistent; a major case of conflicting targets is emerging
between the promotion of infrastructure and competition. On the one
hand, the EU supports plans for investment in networks in structurally
weak areas. It thus tends to favour more established
telecommunications companies which may use this opportunity to
complete their networks. This suggests that in this initiative the
advancement of competition is overshadowed by the cohesion aspect
and the general economic interest. On the other hand, the European
Commission warns Germany – as well as the United Kingdom and
Spain – not to drag its feet further on the opening of the
telecommunications markets. It complains – entirely in the interests
of competition – of monopolistic trends especially in the broadband
network technology known as digital subscriber line (DSL). In Germany,
over 100 companies offer DSL. Nevertheless, Deutsche Telekom holds
the lion’s share of the country’s roughly 3.4 million DSL connections
(nearly 95%).
These facts indicate that the work of the national regulators would be
very much easier if the EU followed a clear line.
Gordian knot with national regulation
Up to now, regulation of the telecommunications sector in Germany
has concentrated more on services than on infrastructure. This could
be explained economically by the fact that operation of the network is
perceived as a natural monopoly. The argument does not go far enough,
though, as it focuses solely on a purely static situation with no
technological advances. It gives no consideration to contestable
markets10 , i.e. the option of using alternative technologies (e.g. mobile
phone, radio, cable or powerline networks) for telecommunications
transmissions and competing in this way with the fixed-line network.
Natural monopoly
The term “natural monopoly“ describes a
constellation in which, owing to particular
characteristics of a production process, it is more
efficient for one single company to supply a
market as a monopolist. The existence of a
monopoly can be economically efficient and does
not necessarily suggest market failure a priori.
Significant economies of scale and scope are the
basis for a natural monopoly. Economies of scale
mean that when the quantity of output increases,
unit costs steadily decline. This can happen if
production plant is indivisible, for instance.
Economies of scope refer to when a bundle of
different products that are made in coupled
processes can be produced at lower unit costs
than when each product is manufactured
separately.
10 The theory of the “contestable market” in the area of technological advances is
based on two reports, i.e. Demsetz, Harold (1968): Why Regulate Utilities?, Journal
of Law and Economics, Vol.2, pp. 55-65; and Baumol, William J., John C. Panzar,
Robert D. Willig (1982): Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure,
New York.
Scope for more extensive
intervention
Cohesion comes before competition
Companies need planning certainty
European Commission warns against
delaying market opening
More drastic punishment for abuse
of market power9 Economics
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To justify its focus on competition in services, the RegTP cites not only
the natural monopoly argument but also others. For example, it claims
that the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector progresses
faster if the newcomer is initially allowed to use the market leader’s
existing infrastructure and competes temporarily only on service
aspects. It says that once the newcomer has become established in
the services market and built up a customer base, the playing field
would automatically widen to include infrastructure. This is by no means
the only conclusion that can be drawn. The proposition of an only weak
link between competition in services and competition in infrastructure
is quite plausible. This is all the more problematic as the European
Commission’s medium-term target of shifting away from sector-specific
regulation by the RegTP towards general technology-neutral supervision
of competition by the antitrust authorities in Germany is barely
conceivable without real competition on infrastructure.
Intense jockeying for positions in the local network
The problem of a lack of competition on infrastructure can be seen
very clearly at the local network level. The economic and political
jockeying among network operators and service providers for their
starting positions is intense. Terms and conditions for network access
– especially the demands to compel service providers to shoulder a
greater share of the actual infrastructure costs than hitherto – remain a
particular point of controversy. So far, no new tariff schedules have
been set – sector spokespersons expect a surcharge averaging
EUR 0.003 per phone minute.
The tariff model takes account of the network operators’ criticisms.
They say that service providers obtain considerable advantages simply
from the fact that they do not have to maintain any cost-intensive
infrastructure of their own. The service providers’ rejoinder is that the
infrastructure costs are sufficiently covered by the end-customer prices
and the additional charge would make transmission overly expensive,
increasing the price by over 50%. In the light of the narrow margins in
the telecoms sector, numerous market exits – besides a decline in the
intensity of competition – seem quite logical as a consequence of the
additional charge. However, even ignoring the hurdle of infrastructure
investment, it emerges that not only service providers have difficulties
to gain a foothold in the local loop. Potential network operators must
also first overcome substantial barriers before they can enter that market
segment. For example, the government sets high standards for
infrastructure build-up and network density – especially for the number
of head-ends.11
Given the barriers to competition DTAG would lose much less market
share in the local loop than on long-distance calls in the course of the
planned market liberalisation. In the local network area, declines of
only 10% of phone-minute volume are realistic. Furthermore, the prices
will fall by about one-fifth at most and thus not nearly as much as on
long-distance calls. If, given this market development, DTAG manages
to compensate for the expected losses by raising the subscriber line
charge, it could in fact improve earnings performance under the
amendment to the telecoms legislation.
11 If the demand for a “local loop” feed for connections were to become law instead
of a “near-origin” feed, the alternative infrastructure operators would have to have
475, instead of 23, head-ends to link with the DTAG network – and would have to
invest correspondingly more in their network infrastructure.
Sector-specific regulation so far still
a going concern
Service providers should shoulder a
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The control over the “last mile“ to the end-customer proves to set the
tone here, too. Therefore, hopes repeatedly surface that alternative
access technologies, such as the broadband cable or powerline
networks12 or especially the mobile telephony or radio networks, might
break the DTAG’s commanding grip on the last mile.
Hype over wireless local loop goes over the top
Wireless local loop (WLL) has been termed extremely important as
regards the dismantling of market barriers to the last mile. Great hopes
were pinned accordingly on the distribution of new frequencies in
August 1999. Normally, WLL refers to a point-to-point radio system
which connects a home or office with the broadband data network.
The bridge between subscriber connection and data network is set up
by means of an antenna and WLL base station. A WLL base station
can handle a large number of subscriber connections within a radius
of several hundred metres. The technology should offer a higher
transmission capacity than ISDN or even DSL and was thus launched
with the claim of being able to challenge DTAG’s dominance.
But WLL fell victim to technological and economic developments. In
the face of collapsing capital markets it was not possible to roll out the
WLL infrastructure without delay across Germany as originally planned.
The actual costs of a WLL connection substantially outstrip the originally
estimated costs and severely constrict the market potential of this
technology. Moreover, DSL, the competing broadband network
technology, became rapidly established at a low price and left little
room for the WLL alternative.
All in all, WLL was unable to meet the market’s high expectations and
currently has at best limited chances of success in some very narrowly
defined niches. Against this backdrop, the providers who have remained
in the market are seeking new application fields and strategic alliances
for their products. People in the sector hope that the RegTP will grant
permission to allow not only individual mobile subscribers but also
hubs to be linked up via radio in future.
WLL is not a success story as things stand today, but it should not be
regarded as proof that all alternatives to fixed-line networks are doomed
to fail from the outset. Mobile telephony is a good example to the
contrary.
Optimistic signals from mobile telephony
Disregarding the conflict over network access and interconnection,
the fixed-line segment faces a serious competitor with the spreading
growth of mobile telephony. Actually, the fixed-line network and the
mobile network started historically from very similar positions. As with
fixed-line technology, DTAG was initially the sole provider for mobile
telephony until 1989. With the advent of the global system for mobile
communication (GSM) as digital standard, competitors started to enter
the mobile market. Four companies were granted a licence in Germany;
the newcomers rapidly gained market share and even drew abreast of
the market incumbent. Today, only two in five of Germany’s roughly 60
million mobile subscribers have a contract with DTAG.
12 For a discussion of the limited chances for the broadband cable and powerline
networks as access technologies see Heng, Stefan (2003): Germany’s broadband
networks - innovation on hold, in: Deutsche Bank Research, E-conomics No. 35,
Frankfurt a.M.
Technology was to challenge
dominance in subscriber connections
WLL fell victim to developments
Technology disappointed high
expectations
Strategic alliances being sought
Competition took root with advent
of GSM11 Economics
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The competitive mobile segment rapidly continues to gain significance.
By the end of 2000 Germany had more mobile subscribers than fixed-
line ones. This progress is partly attributable to the fact that the former
monopolist got its start in the extremely dynamic mobile segment of
the liberalised market with a much smaller technological and economic
lead than in the fixed-line network, which it dominated for many decades.
Even though the high fees for national and international roaming merit
criticism, mobile telephony is, all in all, a good example of market
opening. The dynamic of the mobile segment spurs competition
throughout the telephony sector.
Staying power needed
Telecommunication provides the basis for a strong division of labour in
a globally networked economy. The corollary is that the liberalisation of
the telecoms sector directly affects the growth potential of the entire
economy. A telecoms sector which allows competition and also
encourages technological and economic innovations is a major asset in
the international competition to attract business. Looking at Germany,
this gives reason to ponder why today – five years after the country
started to restructure its market – it is by no means possible to speak
of real, self-sustaining competition among full peers in the
telecommunications sector. In the medium term, alternative
technologies will further advance competition in communication. Today,
mobile telephony is a segment whose dynamic helps to break through
the crusted structures in the overall industry.
Given the shape of the market and as yet inadequate alternatives, the
liberalisation of the local loop will progress much more sluggishly even
after the introduction of free choice of operator than what applied for
long-distance service. Prices will probably decline only marginally, and
the incumbent’s market share to an only limited extent. On the road to
market deregulation the RegTP will have to find a sustainable
compromise between the diametrically opposed demands of the
competitors while also guaranteeing the further upgrading of the
infrastructure. When performing this balancing act the regulator will
increasingly have to focus on competition in infrastructure besides
services. Real competition in the telecommunications sector is
ultimately inconceivable in the long term without competition among
networks.
With the telecommunications legislation being amended, it looks like a
good time to rethink the sanction mechanisms for anti-competitive
violations. However, the policy-makers face a dilemma here. The
punishment for competition-relevant violations must on the one hand
be sufficient to deter wrong-doers, but on the other hand must not be
so heavy-handed that it would fully block the market leader’s activities.
Simply because of its still very large market share, DTAG and its products
more or less automatically set the standards for the entire segment in
Germany. Until the liberalisation of the market kicks in noticeably, a
heavy responsibility for the technological and economic development
of the entire sector will weigh on the shoulders of the former monopolist.
With a view to the further opening of the market, the politicians have
to set the limits early and in no uncertain terms. The regulator needs
effective steering tools. Sufficiently rapid decisions, short procedures
and clear targets are essential for the long-term development of the
telecommunications market on the road to genuine, self-sustaining
competition. This principle of a functioning market should be borne in
mind when the telecommunications legislation is amended.
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Contrary to the optimistic assessment reached by the WIK, it must
not be forgotten that Germany has been very slow to transpose the
EU directives on telecommunications into national law. Liberalisation
has gained momentum only hesitantly and cannot claim the major
successes hoped for, particularly in the broadband area and specifically
in the local loop. Core tasks facing the regulator are to set guidelines
on network access and interconnection, local loop unbundling and third-
party billing. The necessity of having sector-specific, ex ante regulation
will not disappear over the medium term, but a transition to general,
technology-neutral supervision of competition as sought by the
European Commission is not in the offing. Nevertheless, the picture
of “pretend competition“ in Germany goes too far.
Stefan Heng, +49 69 910-31774 (stefan.heng@db.com)
Ongoing need for ex ante regulation